




EUI Working Paper ECO No. 95/43
Rational Stubbornness?

























































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 95/43
Rational Stubbornness?
Robert  W a l dm ann WP 3 3 0  
EUR




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Robert Waldmann 
Printed in Italy in December 1995 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 






























































































European University Institute 
October 20 1995
Professional forecasters m ay be reluctant to adm it that their opinions 
have changed. Even if forecasters sole aim is to convince clients that 
they m ake accurate forecasts, this behavior m ay  be rational. The 
p a tte rn  of forecasts m ay reveal valuable in fo rm ation  abou t the 
forecasters even before the outcom e is realised , for exam ple able 
forecasters m ay revise forecasts less than less able forecasters. If so, 
rational forecasters w ould compromise betw een m inim izing errors and 
m imicking prediction patterns typical of able forecasters.
I w ou ld  like to thank  Jonathan H am ilton, Jam es D ow, A lessandra 






















































































































































































This note considers an advising game in which a professional advisor attem pts to 
convince his client that his forecasts of a random variable are close to the outcome. 
This aim implies that, other things equal, the advisor will provide forecasts which 
he believes will be close to the outcome. In the example presented in this note, 
other things are not equal, and fully rational advisors choose to announce forecasts 
different from the conditional expected value of the variable to  be predicted. In 
Nash equilibrium, advisors will provide their clients with forecasts which do not 
minimize forecast errors. The reason is tha t the pattern of forecasts of able and 
less able forecasters are different. This implies th a t even before the outcome is 
realized, clients have some information on the ability of forecasters. In the example 
presented in this note forecasters make two predictions of the same realization of 
a random variable. In Nash equilibrium, advisors who change their forecast by 
a smaller amount, have smaller forecast errors than advisors who change their 
forecasts by a larger amount.
This paper derives the implications of an advising game where advisors make 
many different forecasts of the same realization of the same variable. In this setting 
it can be possible to estimate an advisor’s ability before the realization of the vari­
able. Advisors who are concerned about their reputation when disclosing repeated 
forecasts to their clients will have other aims in addition to minimizing forecast 
errors. In this note, they do not want to deviate too much from the previous 
announcements. In which way advisors balance their joint objective to  minimize 
forecasts errors and to look good before the outcome is observed depends on the 
specific model and the evaluation rule clients optimally employ in order to deter­
mine the ability of their advisors. In general strategic models of the interaction of 
professional advisors and their clients imply a bias in forecasts. In these models 
expected mean squared forecast errors can be reduced using informational available 
to the advisor when the forecast is made.
Additionally, the cross-sectional implications of the model make it possible to 
distinguish between rational cheating as implied by this and other advising games 
and behavioral models of predictable forecast errors [e.g. Kahneman et. al 1982]. 
In this model advisors announce biased forecasts because it makes them look good. 
Repeated forecasts of the same outcome are biased towards previous forecasts in 
the example presented in this paper. This prediction depends on the details of 
the model. However the general approach used implies tha t in this particular 
model client’s must believe that advisors who change there forecasts by a  small 
amount make good forecasts. In Nash equilibrium this belief must correspond 
to the objected expected value of the magnitude of forecast errors of an advisor 
conditional on the magnitude of the change in the advisor’s forecast. According to 
the model advisors make forecasts biased towards their previous forecasts because 
advisors with small changes in forecasts have small forecast errors. Many strategic 
models imply that forecasts are biased in the direction which creates a pattern 
typical of able advisors. In the example discussed in this note, the pattern typical 
of able advisors is a  small change in forecast from one period to the next. Many 
different patterns may be typical of able advisors, and a  wide variety of examples 



























































































and Gorton 1994, Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1994]. Thus the hypothesis that forecasts 
are biased for strategic reasons does not imply a prediction of the direction of the 
bias. However the joint prediction about the bias in forecasts and the cross sectional 
pattern of forecast errors is quite robust. The general approach to explaining bias 
in forecasts used in this note and in Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1994,95] implies that 
forecasts are biased in a direction typical of able advisors, that is, advisors with 
small forecast errors.
The empirical results in [Ehrbeck 1993, Ehbeck and Waldmann 1994, 1995] 
reject the model of advice presented in this note. According to the model, mean 
squared second period forecast errors should be reduced if the forecast is changed 
to a forecast further from previous forecasts. In fact mean squared forecasts are 
reduced if the forecast is changed towards the previous forecasts. T hat is average 
forecast errors are reduced if if second period forecasts are replaced by a weighted 
average of first and second period forecasts.
The model also implies that advisors with high mean squared changes in fore­
casts have high mean squared forecast errors. This prediction is strongly confirmed 
[Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1995]. This means that the basic approach exemplified by 
the model in this note is invalid. It is easy to construct examples of advising games 
in which forecasts are biased away from previous forecasts [Ehrbeck and Waldmann 
1995], but it is extremely difficult to reverse the (false) prediction that individual 
forecast errors would be reduced if forecasts were moved away from previous fore­
casts without reversing the (true) prediction that advisors with large mean squared 
changes in forecasts have large mean squared forecast errors. This means that the 
data reject the general approach to rationalizing biased forecasts and not narrow 
assumptions of this model or the examples presented in Ehrbeck and Waldmann 
[1994,95],
This paper has four sections the first of which is this introduction. Section 
two formalizes an example of the advising game and discusses testable implica­
tions. Section three briefly reviews the empirical evidence presented in Ehrbeck 
and Waldmann [1995]. Section four concludes.
II . A M odel of A dvice
Rational agents may choose to report public forecasts different from their sub­
jective mean predictions, if honesty is not always the best policy. I assume that 
professional forecasters choose forecasts in order to convince clients that forecast 
errors are small. Clearly, this provides an incentive to report forecasts close to the 
forecaster’s belief about the expected value of the variable forecasted. However , 
it also may create incentives to provide a pattern of forecasts which imply small 
expected forecast errors even before the outcome is observed. In this example, 
it is undesirable to admit tha t earlier forecasts were wrong This implies rational 
stubbornness, that is, advisors adjust their public forecasts too little in response to 




























































































of advisors are negatively correlated with changes in forecasts. Rational clients, in 
turn, suspecting this, extrapolate changes in advisors’ forecasts for their own use. 
In Nash equilibrium, clients do not make systematic forecast errors. The efforts 
of professional advisors to convince their clients tha t they have precise information 
does not cause systematic confusion. As in the signalling literature, many equilibria 
are possible. In this model a change of a stated forecast “means” tha t the forecast­
ers’ beliefs about the conditional mean of the forecasted variable have changed by 
a greater amount.
To formalize this idea, consider the following model. Let there be two agents in 
the following simple model of advice -  an advisor and a c lien t. The advisor provides 
the client with two predictions of the value of a random variable y. The client 
uses these stated predictions to form his own forecast of the value of the variable. 
The client also attem pts to determine the quality of the forecaster’s information 
analyzing the stated forecasts and the realized value of the predicted variable. If 
the client concludes tha t the forecaster has poor information, he terminates the 
relationship and looks for a new forecaster. If the client is not convinced tha t the 
forecaster has poor information, the game is repeated. The forecaster attem pts to 
convince the client tha t he has high quality information. For simplicity, assume an 
forecaster who has no other aim.
In this game, it is assumed that the i 1̂ forecaster receives signal su  in period 
1 then makes a forecast then receives signal sa  in period 2 and makes another 
forecast. Finally the outcome y is realized.
Ehbeck and Waldmann present a simple example of an advising game in which 
there is a Nash equilibrium in which forecasters play pure strategies and in which 
more able forecasters are more willing than less able forecasters to admit tha t they 
were wrong.
Ehbeck and Waldmann [1994,5] argue that the Nash equilibrium in which the 
most able advisors are frank is focal. I will maintain the assumption tha t such Nash 
equilibria are focal throughout this note.
It is assumed that the ith forecaster receives signals:
(1) s h  =  y + u + Vi 
S2i = y + u
The expected value of y conditional on su is equal to sti-
In the second period, the optimal forecast of y is s2. There is no reason why 
the able forecaster would not frankly state his new prediction.
In the example in Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1994,95] it is assumed tha t that 
support of the distribution of 774 is ±  07. This means that all able advisors always 
change their forecast by the same amount, and that any advisor who changes a 
forecast by a different amount reveal tha t they are not able. This is a weak point 
of the analysis in Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1994,95].
Below I relax the assumption that all able forecasters change forecasts by the 




























































































distribution. It is possible to find Nash equilibria in which forecasters play pure 
strategies for a broad class of assumptions about this distribution. For other as­
sumptions, no such equilibrium exists. Here I assume tha t r/i and tj are distributed 
with a density function described by equation (2)
(2) 1 t  / Vi \V i ---------)
(Ti (Ti
«  ~  U f y
(Ti (Ti
Where <?i is a parameter which describes the quality of the signal. I assume 
tha t there are only two types of forecasters -  some with <Tj =  1 and the rest with 
(7; =  a > 1. To simplify notation, I suppress subscript i. I make fairly strong 
assumptions about h both to ensure tractability and to guarantee the existence of 
a Nash equilibrium in which forecasters play pure strategies. I assume that h has 
bounded support and so without loss of generality assume that
(3) h(x) =  0 i f  |x| >  1
I assume that h is symmetric and strictly concave and that for all x
(4) <  W 1))2
To describe agents aims more precisely, I assume that if the posterior odds 
ratio tha t the forecaster is able is less than pmin, then the client terminates the 
relationship and looks for a new forecaster, and that if the posterior odds ratio 
is exactly pmi„, the client is indifferent between keeping the current forecaster and 
looking for a new one. Clients are assumed to observe only the forecasts which they 
purchase and outcomes, so they choose a new forecaster at random. In principal, 
one could model the clients optimal decision process and derive pmi„, but this would 
add unnecessary mathematics. Given the behavior of clients there are, in principal, 
three sorts of second period forecasts. Those which imply a posterior odds ratio 
less than pmjn and loss of a client which will not occur in Nash equilibrium, those 
which imply a  posterior odds ratio of more than pmi„ which will occur, and those 
which imply a posterior odds ratio of exactly pmi„ which will occur with positive 
probability. In Nash equilibrium a broad range of forecasts imply a posterior odds 
ratio of exactly pmm which makes it possible for one to consider clients’ mixed 
strategies in which the probability of terminating the relationship is a freely chosen 
function of the change in forecast. This gives us a  continuum of degrees of freedom 




























































































The forecasters are assumed to have infinite time preference and so to care only 
about whether the client terminates the relationship before paying for the next 
forecast. I only consider Nash equilibria in which able forecasters are frank. I 
then describe indirectly the optimal strategy for less able forecasters and derive an 
optimal mixed strategy for clients. Finally I check that the proposed strategies for 
both types of forecaster are optimal given such a strategy of clients.
First the optimal strategy of the less able forecaster is of the form given by 
equation (5)
(5) / i  =  s ,
h  —  !\  +  <?(s 2 — Si)
for some function g. This is clearly true because of the definitions of si and s2 and 
the symmetry of the distributions of 77 and e.
As noted above, the analysis of the less able forecasters’ strategies depends on 
the resulting clients’ posterior odds ratio. If the change in signal (S2 — si =  —77) is 
small the forecaster can be honest about this change without worrying about losing 
the client. In this case, the forecaster’s only concern is that a second period forecast 
error greater than 1 in absolute value will imply loss of the client. Therefore, the 
forecaster announces / 2 =  s2 the forecast which minimizes this risk. For larger 7/, 
the forecaster will announce a forecast such that the posterior odds ratio is exactly 
Pmin- Nash equilibrium g must be such tha t this occurs for a variety of values of 77 
and resulting values of /2 — /1 =  <?(s2 — Si). This makes it possible to  choose the 
probability tha t the client terminates the relationship as a function of /2 — f \  in 
order to make the g optimal for the forecaster.
Assume that at the beginning of the period the client has a subjective odds ratio 
that the forecaster is able of p m - Since p0u  is based on previous rounds of play, 
equilibrium outcomes are a function of p,,id. Clearly pmm <  p m  or else the client 
would have left already. For there to be a range of changes in forecast which leave 
the client indifferent whether to stay or leave g must be described by differential 







— x  if | i |  <  k 
=  1
=  h{x) if k < |x| <  a






























































































The first boundary condition (6) is discussed at length below. The second boundary 
condition (7) notes tha t less forecasters will never change forecasts by more than 
1 in either direction, as able forecasters never do so, and that they will change 
forecasts by exactly 1 in either direction with positive likelihood as able forecasters 
do so. The differential equation (8) states tha t for A; <  (s2 — si) <  a less able 
forecasters announce a forecast which causes clients to adjust their subjective odds 
ratio to exactly pmm so they are indifferent whether to leave or stay. The term on 
the right is the likelihood of observing a given change in forecast x if the forecaster 
is able. The term on the left is times the likelihood of observing that change in 
forecast if the forecaster is less able and uses g. Finally equation (9) describes k such 
that both boundary conditions hold. Since pmin <  p0u  there is a unique positive k 
as described by equation (9). This, in turn, implies tha t there is a unique g which 
solves equations (8) (6) and (7) for k given by equation (9). Finally note that if 
|x| <  k then inequality (10) holds
Note that equations (6) and (8) implies that g is monotonically increasing and 
differentiable and that its derivative is less than or equal to 1. For 77 close to zero the 
less able forecasters are frank. For larger 77 the less able forecasters are rationally 
stubborn.
I describe clients’ behavior recalling that clients will not leave their forecaster 
if the posterior odds ratio of high ability to low ability is greater than pmin that 
they will leave if is less than pmin and that they might or might not leave if it is 
equal to  pmj„. The clients strategy is as follows. When /2 is stated, if I/2 — / i |  >  1 
the client leaves, since able forecasters never change their forecast by more than 1 . 
If I/2 — / i |  < k the client does not leave as there is insufficient evidence that the 
forecaster is less able. Call the probability that the client leaves after learning the 
second forecast Q(\f2 — /i |) .  Inequality (10) implies that, if Q has the following 
properties then it is optimal for the client.
In Nash equilibrium Q is monotonically increasing creating an incentive for rational 
stubbornness. Any function from |/2 — / i |  t (fc, 1) into the interval (0,1) is an equally 
good response for the client so we can choose it so as to  make the stated strategies 
of forecasters optimal. When y is revealed clients leave if |/2 — y\ >  1, since able 
forecasters would never have such a  large second period forecast error. Otherwise 
y provides evidence of high ability as the posterior odds ratio of able over less able 
increases. T hat is, any y such that I/2 — y| <  1 is more likely to be observed
( 10)
Pm,n h(x/(T) <  ^  
Void &
( i l ) Q(x) =  0 i f  x  <  k 




























































































if the forecaster is able than if the forecaster is less able. This is guaranteed by 
assumption (4) as revealed by a trivial application of the mean value theorem and 
the observation that fi(l) < 1 . A sa  result of their clients’ strategies, both types of 
forecasters balance the risk tha t the client will leave them if the second forecast is 
too far from the first and the risk of a second period forecast error greater than 1 
in absolute value. As assumed above, forecasters ignore any effect of their actions 
on the risk tha t the client leaves in subsequent periods.
Given the clients strategy it is clear that optimal /2 =  s2 if |s2 — 1 <  k. That is
honesty is the best policy in this case since it does not cause summary termination 
as soon as the forecast is revealed and gives the best second period forecast errors. 
For |s2 — Si | >  k, the first order condition for less able forecasters to maximize the 
probability of keeping their client is:
(12) ^ -[(1  -  Q (h  -  />)) r ~ S*+\h ( - ) /o ) d x ]  =  0
CLJ2 •'(/2-S2-I) &
at
/2 =  s i + g ( s 2 - s , )
At optimal / 2, the derivative of the log of the probability of keeping the client 
is also zero which implies equation (13)
(13x ft((g(s2 -  si) -  s2 +  si +  1)/(t) -  h((g(s2 -  Sj) - s 2 + s i -  1 )/a)
fH h f td x
- <T(g(*2 ~  »i))
1 -  Q{g(s2 -  si))
for L =  g(s2 -  si) -  s2 +  si -  1 
and U =  g(s2 — si) — S2 +  si -f 1
Now without loss of generality consider the cases in which s2 > si. This first 
order condition holds for a range of s2 so the derivative of the first order condition 
with respect to s2 is zero.
(14)
[-(1  -  Q(g(s2 -  s ,)))q "(g (s2 -  sQ) -  ( g f o t e  -  s i ) ) ) V ( s 2 -  Sl)
( l - Q ( s 2 - s ,))2 +






























































































S2 affects the first order condition in two ways. First S2 affects f 2 giving terms in 
equation (14) which are multiples of g'{s2 — Si). These terms also appear without 
the factor g'(s2 — s t) in the second derivative with respect to /2 of the probability of 
keeping the client. In addition s2 directly gives the -1 in the term (g'(s2 — si) — 1) in 
equation (14). This direct effect of s2 does not appear in the second derivative with 
respect to f 2 of the log of the chance of keeping the client. The assumption that 
h is concave implies that (h '(^ ) — h'(£)) is negative so inequality (15) the second 
order condition for a maximum holds
„  «  h ( l  -  Q(9(S2 -  s\)))Q"(g(s2 -  s ,)) -  (Q'(9(s2 -  s ,) ))2] ,
(15) -------------------------- ( l - s t e - i o i 5-------------------------- +
W Q  ~ fH h(f)dx  -  ( h Q  -  h Q f
(rfh(f)dxy
Therefore, the forecaster’s strategy g maximizes the chance of keeping the client 
if the client uses strategy Q. Given the broad range of allowed clients’ strategy 
functions Q, equation (12) and (13) simply define the clients strategy Q.
Finally assumption (4) guarantees that it is indeed optimal for the able to be 
frank as assumed. The risk of losing a client immediately after announcing f 2 is, for 
all forecasters, the same function (Q) of the change in forecast so able forecasters 
have an incentive to announce f 2 close to f\ .  However, honesty (}2 = s2) is the 
best policy for the able as it guarantees with probability 1 a second period forecast 
error less than 1 in absolute value. The probability of a second period forecast 
error less than 1 in absolute value decreases at rate h( 1 — \f2 — s2|) as }2 moves 
away from s2, so the log of the probability of a  second period forecast error less 
than one in absolute value decreases at rate h( 1) for small deviations from f 2 = s2. 
Assumption (4) Implies that this is greater than the rate of decrease of the log of 
this probability for the less able, as is shown by applying the mean value theorem 
separately to the numerator and denominator of the first term in the sum on the 
left of equation (13) and recalling that if |x| <  1 then h(x) > h( 1). The less 
able are indifferent about small changes in f 2 or strictly prefer to be frank, so the 
able strictly prefer to be frank. This means tha t the Nash equilibrium in which 
forecasters play pure strategies and able forecasters are frank has been found for a 
broad class of advising games.
While I do not provide a closed form for the Nash equilibrium in which fore­
casters play pure strategies and in which able forecasters are frank, one can derive 
testable implications.
First Nash equilibrium g is continuous. Second, g is one to one, since if the same 
f 2 — /1 were chosen for two different s2 — si, the first term in the sum on on the left 
hand side of (13) would be different and the second term would be equal. Since g 
is continuous and one to one it is monotonic. As described by equation (8) s2 — s 1 




























































































or (13) clearly implies tha t g(s2 — s\) and s2 — S\ have the same sign. Together these 
observations imply that the expected value of the regression coefficient of /2 — y on 
/2 — J\ is negative. This is the first testable prediction.
Second, equation (8) implies that the variance of (/2 — fi)  is greater for less able 
forecasters than for able forecasters. Clearly expected squared forecast errors are 
greater for less able forecasters. They would be greater even if less able forecasters 
minimized mean squared forecast errors, and less able forecasters do not minimize 
mean squared forecast errors in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, across forecasters, 
mean squared changes in forecasts are positively correlated with mean squared 
forecast errors. This is the cross sectional prediction.
Thus the model gives two apparently contradictory predictions -  each individual 
less able forecaster changes his forecast too little to  minimize expected squared er­
rors, yet comparing different forecasters those with larger expected squared changes 
in forecasts have larger expected squared forecast errors. The reason for these two 
predictions is very simple. Less able forecasters balance their desire to have small 
changes in forecasts like able forecasters and their desire to have small forecast 
errors like able forecasters.
This simple argument is likely to apply to a broad class of models including the 
example discussed in this paper. The logic of rational cheating is the same for a 
variety of models. This implies a fairly strong prediction. -  that forecasts are biased 
in a direction which creates a pattern of forecasts typical of able advisor. Ehrbeck 
and Waldmann [1995] discuss a variety of different models which do not imply 
rational stubbornness. In each case there is an implication tha t changes in second 
period forecasts which reduce second period forecast errors make the pattern of 
first and second period forecasts look more like the pattern of forecasters who make 
poor predictions. This general prediction makes models of rational cheating of the 
type discussed in this note, distinguishable from behavioral models of predictable 
forecast errors [Andreasson 1987, Andreasson 1990, Andreasson and Kraus 1990, 
De Bondt and Thaler 1990, Eirhom and Hogarth 1978, Grether 1980, Kahneman 
et. al 1982]. If the bias in forecasts were due to less than full rationality, one 
could easily obtain the opposite prediction. If forecasters have a behavioral bias 
and some have a larger bias than others, one would expect (other things equal) 
that the forecasts with the larger bias would have larger mean squared forecast 
errors. This is the opposite of the pattern implied by the model presented above 
and implies that the evidence reported in Ehbeck and Waldmann [1995] rejects this 
model, and indeed this general approach to rationalizing biased forecasts against 
the alternative behavioral models.
I II . T he M odel is False
This section is very brief because it is entirely devoted to a review of the results in 
Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1995]. Ehbeck and Waldmann [1995] use a  data from the 




























































































make several predictions of the value of some economic variable for the same target 
period. The prediction variable used by Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1995] is the 
forecast of the annualized discount rate on new issues of 91-day US-Treasury Bills, 
based on weekly auction average rates. Each month the panel of experts submits 
predictions of the average interest rate for the quarters of the calendar year. The 
forecast data have consequently been split in three, small homogeneous panels of 
first month, second month, and third month forecasts respectively. Realization 
data  come from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Quarterly averages of discount rates 
are calculated as the simple average of the monthly data  which are quoted on an 
annualized discount basis. For a complete description of the data  see Ehrbeck 
[1993] and Ehrbeck and Waldmann [1994,5]. Ehbeck and Waldmann [1995] report 
tha t forecast errors are positively correlated with changes in forecast. The model 
presented above implies a null hypothesis that forecast errors are not positively 
correlated with changes in forecast. This null is overwhelmingly rejected. A number 
of different estimates of t-like statistics are significantly positive. These include 
statistics which are extremely robust [Ehbeck and Waldmann 1995]. Thus the 
model presented above is false.
In contrast the cross-sectional prediction of the model of rational stubbornness 
is strongly confirmed. Across forecasters large mean squared forecast errors are 
strongly positively correlated with large second period forecast errors. Both the 
correlation and the rank correlation are strongly statistically significant [Ehrbeck 
and Waldmann 1995]. This result is even more problematic for strategic models 
of bias than the rejection of the model of rational stubbornness is. It is easy to 
find examples of strategic bias such that forecast errors are positively correlated 
with changes in forecasts [Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1995]. It is extremely difficult 
to find a model of strategic bias which (correctly) implies that forecaster errors are 
positively correlated with changes in forecasts and that advisors with larger mean 
squared changes in forecasts have larger mean squared forecast errors. Together 
the estimates of bias and the cross sectional result imply th a t some forecasters hurt 
themselves twice by changing their forecasts too much -  first because this creates 
large changes in forecast which are typical of advisors with large second period 
forecast errors and second because this creates larger mean squared forecast errors 
than would result if the forecast had been closer to the older forecast.
It is possible to understand this pattern using a behavioral model of bias. For 
example, forecasters might put too little weight on their past forecast, because 
they are sincerely overestimate the importance of new information, because it is 
more salient. If the degree of salience bias varies across forecasters, then other 
things equal (or uncorrelated) one would expect the more overconfident forecasters 





























































































In this note a model of strategic bias in forecasts is developed and tested. Unlike 
other models of strategic bias [Scharfstein and Stein 1990, Ehrbeck and Waldmann 
1994,5] a Nash equilibrium of the advising game can be found for a variety of distri­
butions of disturbances. This makes it possible to make relatively firm predictions. 
In particular the model makes it clear how a broad class of strategic models of bias 
imply predictions about the bias in forecasts and the pattern of forecasts across 
advisors. In the model presented here and in many such models, forecasts are bi­
ased in the direction which creates a pattern typical of able advisors. This occurs 
because less able advisors balance their desires to minimize forecast errors and to 
create a  pattern of forecasts typical of able advisors. In Nash equilibrium, clients 
will use both the final forecast error and the pattern of forecasts in order to  evaluate 
their advisor.
The specific model presented here implies predictions which are strongly rejected 
by the data. More importantly, the data reject the prediction tha t forecasts are 
biased in a direction which creates a pattern of forecasts typical of advisors with 
small forecast errors [Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1995]. It is extremely difficult to 
reconcile these results with strategic models of bias. In contrast the empirical 
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